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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
   
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-4748 
_____________ 
 
JUDY BREWER, 
Assignee of Tyrone Hamilton, 
     Appellant 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY 
     _______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:10-cv-02540) 
District Judge:  Honorable C. Darnell Jones II 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 22, 2011 
_______________ 
 
Before:  FISHER, HARDIMAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: October 3, 2011) 
 _______________ 
 
OPINION 
________________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
Appellant Judy Brewer (“Brewer”) appeals the District Court‟s December 13, 
2010 Order dismissing her complaint, which alleges that the United States Fire Insurance 
Company (“U.S. Fire”) breached its duty to provide coverage, as required under her 
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policy.  Brewer alleges that U.S. Fire acted in bad faith because it had a duty to provide 
coverage and acted with reckless indifference and conscious disregard in disclaiming 
coverage based on the policy‟s „Employee Indemnification and Employer Liability 
Exclusion‟ (“Exclusion”) clause.  U.S. Fire moved to dismiss Brewer‟s complaint based 
on the Exclusion clause, which eliminates coverage for claims made by an employee of 
an insured.  The District Court granted U.S. Fire‟s motion to dismiss, pursuant to FED. R. 
CIV. P. 12(b)(6).  Brewer filed a timely notice of appeal.  For the following reasons, we 
will affirm the District Court‟s Order of Dismissal. 
I.     BACKGROUND 
We write primarily for the benefit of the parties, and therefore recount only the 
essential facts.  On January 20, 2006, Brewer, a Service Plus Delivery Systems, Inc. 
(“Service Plus”) employee, was injured in an automobile accident caused by Tyrone 
Hamilton (“Hamilton”), a Safecare Ambulance Services, Inc. (“Safecare”) employee.  
Both Brewer and Hamilton were acting in the course and scope of their employment.  At 
the time of the accident, a U.S. Fire insurance policy was in effect, listing the named 
insureds as “Safecare Ambulance Services, Inc., t/a Network Ambulance” and “Service 
Plus Delivery Systems, Inc.”1  As a result of the accident, Brewer filed suit and obtained 
a $250,000 judgment against Hamilton.  In an effort to avoid immediate execution on the 
judgment, Hamilton assigned his breach of contract and bad faith claims against any and 
all insurers, including, but not limited to, U.S. Fire, to Brewer.   
                                                 
1 
The two companies, Safecare Ambulance Services, Inc. and Services Plus Delivery 
Systems, Inc., are separate and distinct entities. 
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Invoking the Exclusion clause, U.S. Fire denied coverage to Hamilton.
2
  Based on 
the assignment, Brewer filed suit to enforce Hamilton‟s rights under the policy.  Brewer, 
as assignee of Hamilton, seeks $250,000 in compensatory damages, interest, incidental, 
consequential and punitive damages, and costs and fees.  The main point of contention is 
the language of the policy itself.  In pertinent part, the terms of the Exclusion prohibit 
coverage for “bodily injury to an employee of the insured arising out of and in the course 
of employment for the insured.”  (J.A., Vol. II, 42a.) 
II.     JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c).  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6 ), we exercise 
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 The language of the Exclusion clause reads as follows:  
 
 B. Exclusions 
 This insurance does not apply to any of the following: 
*  *  * 
 4. Employee Indemnification and Employer’s Liability 
  “Bodily Injury” to: 
a.  An “employee” of the “insured” arising out of and in the course 
of: 
    (1) Employment by the “insured”; or 
(2) Performing the duties related to the conduct of the 
“insured‟s” business; or 
b. The spouse, child, parent, brother or sister of that “employee” as a 
consequence of Paragraph a. above. 
 
 This exclusion applies: 
(1) Whether the “insured” may be liable as an employer or in 
any other capacity; and 
(2) To any obligation to share damages with or repay 
someone else who must pay damages because of the injury.  
(See J.A., Vol. II, 42a.) 
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plenary review over a district court‟s grant of a motion to dismiss.  Grier v. Klem, 591 
F.3d 672, 676 (3d Cir. 2010).  
III. ANALYSIS 
 To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ----, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  “In deciding a motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded allegations of the 
complaint must be taken as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiffs, and all inferences must be drawn in favor of them.”  McTernan v. City of York, 
577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).   
On December 10, 2010, the District Court granted U.S. Fire‟s motion to dismiss, 
concluding that under the plain language of the policy, the Exclusion clause was 
triggered.  In its opinion, the District Court relied upon case law analyzing the application 
of the Employee Indemnification and Employer‟s Liability Exclusion.   
Brewer‟s claim asserts that coverage exists under the plain language of U.S. Fire‟s 
insurance policy.  The relevant portion of the policy involves the definition of insured.  In 
the policy, the definition of “insured” provides: 
 “Insured” means any person or organization qualifying as an insured in the 
Who Is An Insured provision of the applicable coverage.  Except with 
respect to the Limit of Insurance, the coverage afforded applies separately 
to each insured who is seeking coverage or against whom a claim or “suit” 
is brought. 
  
(J.A., Vol. II, 49a). 
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Brewer posits that after employing a plain reading of U.S. Fire‟s policy, “if the 
above definition of “insured” is substituted in for the word “insured” in the Employee 
Indemnification and Employer‟s Liability Exclusion clause asserted by Appellee, the 
Exclusion clause provides that: 
“This insurance does not apply to . . . bodily injury to an employee of the 
insured against whom a claim or suit is brought.”  (Appellant‟s Br. at 15).   
 
Brewer‟s hypothesis continues that if the Exclusion clause is read as such, it would 
not be applicable to her because (1) the injury is to her; (2) the insured seeking coverage 
is Hamilton; and (3) Brewer is not Hamilton‟s employee. 
The District Court‟s view of the application of the Exclusion clause is 
diametrically opposed to Brewer‟s.  The Court determined that the Exclusion clause 
appropriately applied to Brewer because under Pennsylvania law and the U.S. Fire 
policy, both Brewer‟s and Hamilton‟s employers are insured.  Hence, if Brewer stands in 
Hamilton‟s stead and Hamilton in the first instance is precluded from coverage, then so is 
Brewer. 
This analysis is based on Pennsylvania Mfrs.‟ Ass‟n Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. and 
Sur. Ins. Co., 233 A.2d 548 (Pa. 1967).  In PMA, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held 
that in “the unambiguous language of the policy, the unqualified word „insured‟ includes 
the named insured.”  Id. at 552.  Brewer argues that the policy at issue here is materially 
different from the policy at issue in PMA, where, she claims, the „separation of insureds‟ 
provision is not contained within the definition of „insured,‟ but is only located in certain 
coverage provisions.  She further contends that the PMA analysis is not applicable to 
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every case where a policy contains a „separation of insureds‟ clause, particularly where 
the plain language mandates a finding of coverage, as is the case here.   
We find that PMA is applicable to the instant case.  In PMA, the plaintiff‟s insurer 
brought an action against defendant insurer regarding the interpretation of the word 
“insured” in an employee exclusion policy.  Id. at 549.  The PMA policy contained an 
Exclusion clause making it inapplicable to bodily injury of any employee of the insured.  
Id. at 550.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that employees of the named insured 
fell within the employee Exclusion clause.  Id. at 548. The Court also found that the 
unambiguous language of the policy dictated that the word “insured” included the named 
insured, and therefore, the employee of plaintiff‟s insured was excluded from coverage.  
Id. at 552.   
Similarly, the language of the policy in the instant case is clear that both Service 
Plus and Safecare are employers, and both Brewer and Hamilton are employees under the 
policy.  Therefore, because Hamilton is not covered under his policy with Safecare, 
Brewer, in his stead, is also not covered.    
Brewer insists that the definition of „insured‟ is the crux of the matter.  
Specifically, she contends that the second sentence of the definition of „insured,‟ as it is 
written in the Exclusion clause, serves as a „separation of insureds‟ provision, which 
provides that the coverage afforded applies separately to each insured.  Brewer argues 
that, based on the separation of insureds provision, the term “insured” does not apply 
when the insured seeking coverage is separate from the insured bringing suit, and that 
unlike PMA, the “„separation of insureds‟ clause is contained in a paragraph which 
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defines and/or modifies the word „insured.‟”  (See Appellant‟s Br. at 16.)  She insists that 
the policy be read in such a way that coverage would not be provided for bodily injury to 
„an employee of the insured‟3 against whom a claim or suit is brought, but that since she 
is not an employee of Hamilton‟s, the Exclusion clause would not apply to her.  This 
reasoning is incorrect.   
Brewer and Hamilton are employed by a named insured.  Because the Exclusion 
clause specifically excludes coverage for “bodily injury to an employee of the insured 
arising out of and in the course of employment by the insured,” the District Court 
concluded, “[u]nder the undisputed facts as pleaded, [appellant] suffered bodily injury 
while acting in the course and scope of her employment by a named insured.  Under the 
plain language of the policy, this triggers the Employee Indemnification and Employer‟s 
Liability Exclusion.”  (J.A., Vol. II, 3a).   
“When the language of an insurance contract is clear and unambiguous, a court is 
required to enforce that language.”  Med. Protective Co. v. Watkins, 198 F.3d 100, 103 
(3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).  We find that the Exclusion clause denies coverage to 
any employee of “the insured,” and that includes Brewer.  The District Court 
appropriately relied upon PMA in finding that U.S. Fire‟s Exclusion clause was 
applicable to Brewer.  Brewer is excluded from coverage under the plain language of the 
policy.  We find no error. 
                                                 
3
 Brewer argues that „an employee of the insured‟ should be substituted for „insured‟ in 
the policy.  There is no basis to read the policy in this manner.  We shall not do so here. 
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 Brewer next argues that the District Court erred in dismissing her bad faith claim 
against U.S. Fire, contending that U.S. Fire: (1) had a duty to provide coverage; and (2) 
acted with reckless indifference and conscious disregard in disclaiming coverage based 
on the exclusion discussed above.   
“Bad faith must be proven by clear and convincing evidence and not merely 
insinuated.”  Terletsky v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 649 A.2d 680, 688 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1994).  “To recover under a claim of bad faith, the plaintiff must show that the 
defendant did not have a reasonable basis for denying benefits under the policy and that 
defendant knew or recklessly disregarded its lack of reasonable basis in denying the 
claim.”  Id.  “Mere negligence or bad judgment is not bad faith.”  Id.   We find that 
Brewer‟s claim of bad faith goes against the weight of the evidence, and U.S. Fire did not 
act in bad faith when it denied coverage to Brewer under the policy.                               
“The Supreme Court‟s Twombly formulation of the pleading standard can be 
summed up thus: “stating . . . a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter 
(taken as true) to suggest” the required element.  This “does not impose a probability 
requirement at the pleading stage,” but instead “simply calls for enough facts to raise a 
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of” the necessary element.”  
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. 
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). 
Under the holding in Twombly, Brewer‟s complaint must contain enough factual 
allegations such that discovery would provide evidence of each element of the claim.  It 
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does not.  The District Court correctly dismissed Brewer‟s claim of bad faith against U.S. 
Fire.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s Order of Dismissal.4 
                                                 
4
 Because we have disposed of the bad faith claim, we need not address Brewer‟s claims 
regarding punitive damages.  See Terletsky v. Prudential Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 649 
A.2d 680, 690 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). 
